Norms and Narratives:  Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error  Colloquy by Delgado, Richard & Stefancic, Jean
Alabama Law Scholarly Commons 
Articles Faculty Scholarship 
1990 
Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error 
Colloquy 
Richard Delgado 
University of Alabama - School of Law, rdelgado@law.ua.edu 
Jean Stefancic 
University of Alabama - School of Law, jstefancic@law.ua.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_articles 
Recommended Citation 
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error Colloquy, 
69 Tex. L. Rev. 1929 (1990). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_articles/557 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Alabama Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Alabama Law Scholarly 
Commons. 




I. Introduction .............................................. 1929
II. Notorious Cases and Saving Narratives: What the
Juxtaposition Shows ...................................... 1934
A. Dred Scott and Plessy v. Ferguson .................... 1934
B. Indian Cases ......................................... 1939
C. The Chinese Exclusion Case ........................... 1943
D. The Japanese Internment Cases ....................... 1945
E. Bradwell v. Illinois ................................... 1947
F Buck v. Bell .......................................... 1948
G. Bowers v. Hardwick .................................. 1950
III. Law and Literature: The Canon and the Possibility of
Counternarratives ......................................... 1952
A. The Role of the Anthologist: Examining the Current
Canon ............................................... 1953
B. The Appellate Function and Saving Narratives: Posner's
Incompatibility Relation ............................... 1956
C. Narratives and the Situated Actor: Our Stories, Our
Selves ................................................ 1957
IV. Breaking the Circle: Two Ways of Avoiding Serious Moral
Error ..................................................... 1958
I. Introduction
We like to think of the common law as evolving toward ever higher
reaches of wisdom and flexibility. We have even higher hopes for our
public, constitutional jurisprudence. Despite lofty ambitions of justice,
however, our system of law has yielded many embarrassingly inhumane
decisions.' Opinions steeped in what we later see as serious moral error
* Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D. 1974, Boalt Hall
School of Law, University of California at Berkeley.
** Technical Services Librarian, University of San Francisco School of Law. M.L.S. 1963,
Simmons College; M.A. 1989, University of San Francisco. We gratefully acknowledge the assist-
ance of Liz Griffin in the preparation of this Article.
1. See infra notes 15, 16, 47, 57, 62, 72, 85, 86, 102, 116, 127 and accompanying text. We are
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come down all too frequently-at least one per generation. 2 Every
casebook has chapters devoted to doctrines or precedents that we are
glad to relegate to history.3 And anyone who reads legal biography
knows that even the most eminent Justices-Taney, Holmes, Field, Mar-
shall-have chapters that mar their otherwise outstanding careers.4
One obvious explanation for these mistakes is judicial inability to
identify, imaginatively, with the persons whose fate is being decided.-
Because of the particularized stock of life experiences and understand-
ings judges bring to the bench, these notorious opinions seemed to their
authors unexceptionable, natural, "the truth."'6 Only hindsight, bene-
fited by increased empathy and understanding, exposes an opinion as
monstrous, anomalous-a moral abomination.7
If a judicial lack of other-awareness rendered these now-embarrass-
ing opinions acceptable at the time, would it have made a substantial
not the first to write of such matters. See, eg., R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTI-SLAVERY AND
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975) (discussing the dilemma of the antislavery judge in choosing between
his conscience and the era's accepted legal principles regarding slavery); P. IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR
(1983) (examining the tragedy of the Japanese-American wartime cases).
2. Our own generation is no exception. See infra notes 62, 85-86, 127 and accompanying text.
The concept of "serious moral error" is, of course, impossible to define and perhaps ultimately
incoherent. See Critique of Normativity, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1991). We use the term in three
limited senses. A decision will be said to embrace serious moral error if (1) it lacks nuance to an
embarrassing degree (see infra notes 9-10, 122-23, 145-47 and accompanying text); (2) it is broadly
or universally condemned by subsequent generations, somewhat akin to being overruled (see infra
notes 10-11, 173-78 and accompanying text); (3) its assumptions, eg., about women, are roundly
refuted by later experiences (see infra notes 102-15 and accompanying text). Judges will always
hand down decisions that will seem offensive to some. We reserve the term "serious moral error" for
those shocking cases that virtually everyone later condemns.
3. See, eg., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 356, 549 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing
Dred Scott, which upheld slavery); id. at 1466-68, 1524 (discussing Korematsu, the Japanese intern-
ment case); id. at 567-86 (explaining Lochner, which struck down protective labor laws).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 19-21 (discussing Taney's role in writing Dred Scott);
text accompanying notes 116-22 (examining Holmes's role in upholding involuntary sterilization in
Buck v. Bell); text accompanying notes 72-76 (reviewing Field's role in upholding Chinese exclu-
sion); and text accompanying notes 47-56 (analyzing Marshall's role in establishing early principles
of American Indian law which dispossessed Native Americans of their ancestral lands and denied
them full citizenship); see also Agneshwar, Ex-Justice Says He May Have Been Wrong, Nat'l L.J.,
Nov. 5, 1990, at 3 (quoting Justice Powell as confessing he "probably made a mistake" in upholding
a conviction under a Georgia sodomy law in Bowers v. Hardwick).
5. For different approaches to the same problem, see K. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA:
EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 237-38 (1989) (arguing that the courts' failure to
look behind abstract legal principles to "recognize real harms to real people" has made the law an
instrument of social inequality); Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1576
(1987) (rejecting the legal system's assumption that legality and empathy are mutually exclusive).
6. On the ability of ingrained views to take on the appearance of objective truth, see Delgado,
Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved? (Book Review), 97 YALE
L.J. 923 (1988) (reviewing D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE (1987)).
7. That is, we do not view the mistake as a technical one (eg., failing to reflect carefully on
precedent), nor as one of prudence (eg., exercising bad business judgment in a contract matter).
Rather, we condemn the judge for a collapse of morals or of nerve.
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difference if the judges had tried to expose themselves to other points of
view? Can such exposure accelerate the process of defining justice? The
Law and Literature movement promotes a broadened perspective of our
condition through the reading of great works with just this ambition in
mind. Members of the movement believe that by reading and discussing
the world's great texts, lawyers and judges may gain empathy through
vicarious experience and thereby avoid pitfalls to which they might
otherwise succumb.8 How much of this belief is idealistic wishful
thinking?
A precise answer to this question is, of course, unattainable, but it is
8. The Law and Literature movement is diverse and includes many claims:
- (i) The study of literature expands the lawyer's creative mind. For instance, David B. Saxe has
argued that literature "touches and expands our imagination and intuitive nature .... For the
lawyer and the judge, much professional activity revolves around the need to use imagination and
intuition effectively .... [E]xploration of great literary works may enliven the creative and, hence,
the professional ability of the lawyer and judge." Saxe, Billy Budd, Law Teacher, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 11,
1988, at 13; see also Denvir, Comic Relief, 63 TUL. L. REv. 1423, 1429 (1989) (asserting that "litera-
ture's focus on the particular is a healthy antidote for law's obsession with the abstract").
(ii) The study of law and literature promotes the development of values and an understanding
of the human condition. Writers have articulated the idea in various ways: "Literature then sup-
ports a fuller appraisal of the human condition-an essential component of the sensitive judge....
[B]y allowing creative instincts to operate within the framework of the legal process, lawyers and
judges will be able to respond as fuller human beings." Saxe, supra, at 14; "Law and Literature,
from its infancy, has posited as its major claim the notion that lawyers have the responsibility to
explore constantly their own individual and professional values, to challenge them constantly and try
to improve them, and to admit that those values exist and implicate almost everything that lawyers
do." Weisberg, Coming of Age Some More: "Law and Literature" Beyond the Cradle, 13 NOvA L.
REV. 107, 122 (1988); "Rightness-virtue--can be understood through literature," id. at 123; "[Law
and Literature] is the study of values and human rights from literary perspectives," Page & Weis-
berg, Foreword: The Law and Southern Literature, 4 Miss. C.L. REv. 165, 165 (1984); "[L]iterature
... conditions the feelings [and] ... through such conditioning, literature alms at framing the ethical
and religious standards for what is usually called the policy part of a judicial opinion." Smith &
Laughlin, Afterword: Law, Literature and Ethics, 4 Miss. C.L. REv. 327, 328-29 (1984) (footnote
omitted).
(iii) Law and Literature promotes a better understanding of constitutional values and analogies.
Jay Wishingrad has suggested:
[Tihe study of law and literature is necessary ... to bring us intellectually closer to our
distinguished literary predecessors at the bar ... [L]t is imperative to remember that the
"authors" of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were Renaissance-Enlightenment men,
well versed in literary and classical texts and Enlightenment philosophy. Consequently,
one must read the Constitution and the Bill of Rights imaginatively, and not just techni-
cally ....
Wishingrad, Why Law and Literature?, N.Y.L.J., June 23, 1986, at 2, col. 3 (emphasis in original).
Wishingrad added: "By applying some of the tenets of new critical theories of reading, along with
classical analogical legal reasoning, one can formulate... constitutional analogies from two or more
amendments in the Bill of Rights. Such analogies can elucidate rights inherent in, and consistent
with, the Constitution's text and structure. Such analogies can also bring us closer to the specific
and general intentions of the Constitution's myriad of 'authors,' namely leading literary lawyers such
as Madison and Jefferson .... Id.
(iv) Law and Literature promotes a better grasp of professional responsibility. William H. Page
made this point: "[L]egal subjects like jurisprudence and professional responsibility also deal with
topics like the nature of law, the relationship of law and morality, and the duty to obey the law....
[L]iterature... develop[s] ... narrative[s] that may be more illuminating than abstract discussion.
1931
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our premise that some insight into the potential and limits of the Law
and Literature movement can be gained by examining it at a higher level
of concreteness than is usually employed. Accordingly, we look to a
handful of cases that society has judged harshly and seek to identify
then-current literature that might have changed the outcome of the cases
or the tone of the opinions.
In Part II, we examine the practical merits of the Law and Litera-
ture movement. We review illustrative constitutional decisions embody-
ing serious moral error and juxtapose those decisions with literary texts
that possess a narrative or perspective that the opinion's author was not
aware of or ignored. In each case, the narrative might plausibly have
saved the judge from serious moral error-or at least have made writing
the wrong decision more difficult.9
While some of the cases illustrating serious moral error display a
blithe, almost mechanical simplicity, as though the author were com-
pletely unaware of the treacherous moral ground on which he trod, more
often the opinions betray a hint of moral ambivalence. The tension be-
tween what is proclaimed as "law" and the subsequent retreats and dis-
claimers, which often take the form of recitations on the limits of the
judicial role, reveals traces of a Pilate-like fear of reprobation. To the
discerning reader, the "our hands are tied" disclaimer betrays doubts
about the moral correctness of the holding-doubts troubling enough to
These value-laden questions resist theoretical discussion .... Page, The Place of Law and Litera-
ture, 39 VAND. L. REv. 391, 416 (1986).
(v) The study of law and literature can "enrich our understanding of great literature that is
steeped in law and lawyers." Wishingrad, supra.
(vi) Law and Literature improves legal writing. According to Richard Weisberg, reading one
novel a month provides adequately educated lawyers with models of clarity and color to use in their
professional writing. Weisberg, supra.
(vii) Understanding literature helps us to understand a traditional legal subject, e.g., "defama-
tion by fiction." R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 9 (1988); see
also Rich & Brilliant, Defamation-In-Fiction: The Limited Viability of Alternative Causes of Action,
52 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1986) (discussing theories of defamation by fictional portrayal).
(viii) Literature can supply insight into the nature and origins of law. For example, revenge
literature depicts "the system of justice that precedes an organized legal system, provides a template
for the legal system when law first emerges, reasserts itself when the legal system breaks down, and,
because of its personalistic and emotional character, offers an illuminating contrast to the ideals of
impersonality, neutrality, and objectivity that inform the law." Id. at 354.
(ix) The study of law and literature yields a broader perspective on law and culture: "The life
of the law, as Justice Holmes wrote, is rooted in experience more than logic. Experience and expo-
sure to others are needed for the lawyer to bring vision to his presentation and make it stand out.
Exposure to literature can bring us into contact with worlds beyond our own and yield perceptions
broader and deeper than those that even the most involved person can gain by direct observation."
Leventhal, Law and Literature: A Preface, 32 RUToERS L. REv. 603, 606 (1979). See also Denvir,
supra, at 1433-36 (discussing the lessons constitutional law can draw from Shakespeare's The Win-
ter's Tale).
9. For advocacy of this plausible view, see supra note 8. We will qualify this claim drastically
in infra notes 148-59 and accompanying text.
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compel a denial of personal responsibility, but not so troubling as to in-
spire meaningful action.10
Could reading a well-written, deeply felt counternarrative save a
judge from history's condemnation in cases such as the ones we will dis-
cuss? Part III examines this possibility and concludes that the saving
potential of most counternarratives is much more limited than we would
like to believe or than Law and Literature proponents acknowledge. We
are all situated actors, whose selves, imaginations, and range of possibili-
ties are constructed by our social setting and experience. We are, in a
sense, our current narratives. Thus, an unfamiliar narrative invariably
generates resistance; despite our best efforts, counterstories are likely to
effect at most small, incremental changes in the listener or reader. As
the pieces in this Symposium show, the question of the extent to which
one may escape one's cultural milieu is complex and vexing. But we raise
an even more disconcerting possibility: not only does our status as situ-
ated actors create in judges and other policy-makers a resistance to po-
tentially saving counternarratives, but it limits the very range of
counternarratives in the canons from which policy-makers might draw.
So long as this is true, Law and Literature can save us from minor, but
not major moral error-from tomorrow's, but not next century's con-
demnation. Even the most aptly chosen tales can enable us only to es-
cape from one intellectual prison to another, slightly larger, but equally
confining one.
To illustrate our predicament, we include summaries and charts of
the current Law and Literature canon showing that certain voices and
narratives, potentially of the "saving" variety, are notably missing. If the
anthologists, men and women of broad education and wide sympathies,
compiled such narrow lists, how potent a corrective force could those
lists be for busy judges? The canon is always narrow because counternar-
ratives, even when they exist and are known, are assimilated and under-
stood in light of the anthologist's experience. Stories that deviate too
much from our own experience strike us as wrong, untrue, coercive,
"political"-unworthy of inclusion. Saving narratives thus rarely come
to the attention of busy bureaucrats, like judges. And when they do,
judges reject them for reasons we detail.
Culture, in short, does determine the Self, as the other works in this
Symposium show.'1 While this insight aids analysis and helps us come to
10. For an example of an opinion's betraying the author's inner fear or doubt, see infra notes
51-56 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Winter, Foreword: On Building Houses, 69 TEXAs L. REV. 1595 (1991); Scblag,
The Problem of the Subject, 69 TExAS L. REV. 1627 (1991).
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grips with certain dichotomies, such as Self-Other and subject-object, we
draw from it an even more sobering lesson about the possibilities for so-
cial reform. External reality (the bed out there) and the self (in here)
may be socially created constructs whose meanings are interdependent
and gain plausibility from repeated use.12 But if one of our tasks in life is
to make the bed, not just to understand it, then being in the bed may
become a serious obstacle to remaking it. Part IV suggests means by
which we may nevertheless make some limited progress, including a new,
more audacious role for reform-minded lawyers within the Law and
Literature movement.
II. Notorious Cases and Saving Narratives: What the Juxtaposition
Shows
In this Part, we review nine opinions generally regarded as embrac-
ing serious moral error. The cases today are widely condemned.13 Yet
each, at the time of its writing, seemed to the author unexceptionable and
true. The cases all center around the treatment of subordinated groups:
blacks, women, indigenous people, Asians, homosexuals, and retarded
persons. We follow each opinion with a corresponding counternarrative
that might have saved its author from serious moral error. In each case,
the justice either wrote unaware of the narrative or simply ignored it.
Consequently, when society later adopted the counternarrative, condem-
nation followed.
A. Dred Scott and Plessy v. Ferguson
[Abolitionists] seek an object which they well know to be a
revolutionary one. They are perfectly aware that the change in the
relative condition of the white and black races in the slaveholding
States, which they would promote, is beyond their lawful author-
ity;.., that it cannot be effected by any peaceful instrumentality of
theirs; that ... the only path to its accomplishment is through
burning cities, and ravaged fields, and slaughtered populations;...
and that the first step in the attempt is the forcible disruption of a
country embracing in its broad bosom a degree of liberty, and an
amount of individual and public prosperity, to which there is no
parallel in history.... [T]hey endeavor to prepare the people of the
12. This view is associated with modernist and postmodernist scholars such as Pierre Schlag
and Steven Winter. See Schlag, supra note 11; Winter, supra note 11. For further discussion of
modernist theories of world-making, see generally N. GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING (1978);
E. SCHUMACHER, A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED (1977); P. BERGER & T. LUCKMAN, SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1967); and Delgado, Legal Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others:
A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2416 (1989).




United States for civil war by doing everything in their power to
deprive the Constitution and the laws of moral authority, and to
undermine the fabric of the Union by appeals to passion and sec-
tional prejudice, by indoctrinating its people with reciprocal hatred
-President Pierce's message to
Congress about the abolitionists,
Dec. 185614
The two most notorious cases upholding this nation's treatment of
blacks, Dred Scott v. Sandford 15 and Plessy v. Ferguson,16 are now uni-
versally condemned. 17 But at the time of their decision, they were ac-
cepted as valid and even inevitable constitutional renderings. 18 In Dred
Scott, Chief Justice Taney painstakingly explained why blacks could not
become citizens. He relied primarily on the long history of the white
man's disdain for blacks to show that the writers of the Declaration of
Independence and the framers of the Constitution could not have meant
to include blacks in their eloquent demands of liberty for all men:
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings
of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white
race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that
they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and
that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for
his benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary
article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made
by it. This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the civi-
lized portion of the white race. It was regarded as an axiom in
morals as well as in politics, which no one thought of disputing, or
supposed to be open to dispute .... 19
The circularity of the reasoning is apparent: had they been worthy
of citizenship, we could not have treated them so badly. Taney's writing
reached near-ironic proportions when he pointed to the high moral char-
acter of the founding fathers as further proof that blacks were not meant
to be included within the protections of the document:
[T]he men who framed the declaration were great men-high in
literary acquirements-high in their sense of honor, and incapable
14. President's Message to Congress, CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. app. 1 (1856).
15. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
16. 163 U.S. 537 (1895).
17. See Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and The Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 935, 954
(1989) (noting that "Plessy v. Ferguson is now universally condemned"); Pollak, We're Going to Miss
You on the Court Because We Need You (Book Review), 99 YALE L.J. 2091, 2102 (1990) (reviewing
J. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTs: HUGO BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
MODERN AMERICA (1989)) (finding that Dred Scott is "completely discredited").
18. Thus there are few dissents. See, e.g., infra notes 30, 35, and accompanying text.
19. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407.
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of asserting principles inconsistent with those on which they were
acting. They perfectly understood the meaning of the language
they used, and how it would be understood by others; and they
knew that it would not in any part of the civilized world be sup-
posed to embrace the negro race, which, by common consent, had
been excluded from civilized Governments and the family of na-
tions, and doomed to slavery.
20
With this as his predicate, Taney could justify rejection of blacks' citizen-
ship claims by straightforward strict interpretation: "It is not the prov-
ince of the court to decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy or
impolicy, of these laws .... The duty of the court is, to interpret the
instrument they have framed... according to its true intent and meaning
when it was adopted. 21 Taney's reasoning says much more about the
moral character of the Framers (some of whom had slaves) than it does
about justice.
Could the Dred Scott majority have been swayed by a saving narra-
five? In 1857, relatively few slave writings were published, for obvious
reasons. But Harriet Beecher Stowe's widely read abolitionist novel, Un-
cle Tom's Cabin,22 was published in 1852, and it is likely that the Justices
had heard of it. Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass,23 published
in 1845, was equally well known, and Douglass himself was a respected
scholar and speaker.24 Would Taney have been able to write his vindica-
tion of slavery if he had read even the first chapter of Douglass's narra-
tive? There, Douglass recounted the pain of never having known his
mother.25 He remembered the comfort of her presence on the few occa-
sions her master allowed her, after a day's work in the fields, to walk the
twelve miles to see her son.26 She had to start back almost immediately
in order to be back in the field at sunrise and spare herself a whipping.
For what this separation is done, I do not know, unless it be to
hinder the development of the child's affection toward its mother,
and to blunt and destroy the natural affection of the mother for the
child.
27
Douglass's feelings about his father-master were as bitter as his feelings
for his mother were tender. He said:
20. Id. at 410.
21. Id. at 405.
22. H. BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN (K. Sklar ed. 1982) (1st ed. 1852).
23. F. DOUGLASS, Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An African Slave, in THE CLAS-
SIC SLAVE NARRATIVES (H. Gates ed. 1987) (1st ed. 1845). Douglass's book sold well-l1,000
copies between 1845 and 1847. See id. at xi.
24. On Douglass's prominent role, see D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 3, 20
n.9, 30-31, 48 n.3 (2d ed. 1980); see also B.T. WASHINGTON, FREDERICK DOUGLASS (1906).






[S]laveholders have ordained, and by law established, that the chil-
dren of slave women shall in all cases follow the condition of their
mothers; and this is done too obviously to administer to their own
lusts, and make a gratification of their wicked desires profitable as
well as pleasurable.
28
Could Taney and the majority have remained unaffected after reading
Douglass's account of the suffering of an entire race for the sake of an-
other race's economic and social comfort? Could they have resisted em-
pathizing with the sensitive child described by Douglass, who was forced
to awaken each morning to a world full of characters more terrible than
those the Justices imagined in their worst childhood nightmares? 29
Could any white reader fail to react with horror and shame?
Douglass's narrative was published more than ten years before the deci-
sion in Dred Scott, but we can guess that the Justices had not bothered to
read it (or that it did not affect their decision), for six of the eight others
agreed with Taney's denial of citizenship for blacks, and the dissents did
not have the force to save.30
Justice Brown's opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson is equally notorious for
its disdainful treatment of the black race. While a justification of public
segregation is less outrageous than one of slavery, the tone of Brown's
opinion renders it equally offensive. It is blithely patronizing and betrays
little knowledge of the wrong perpetrated on blacks. Brown found that
the Louisiana statute requiring blacks to ride in a coach "separate but
equal to" the one for whites violated neither the Thirteenth nor the Four-
teenth Amendment because a merely
legal distinction between the white and colored races-a distinc-
tion which is founded in the color of the two races, and which must
always exist so long as white men are distinguished from the other
race by color-has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the
two races
3 1
and because the Fourteenth Amendment "could not have been intended
... to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality. '32
Brown rejected the idea that "the enforced separation of the two
races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority" and added: "If
this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely
28. Id. at 256-57.
29. "I have often been awakened at the dawn of day by the most heart-rending shrieks of an
own aunt of mine, whom he used to tie up to a joist, and whip upon her naked back till she was
literally covered with blood .... The louder she screamed, the harder he whipped .... I never shall
forget it whilst I remember any thing." Id. at 258.
30. Only Justices McLean and Curtis dissented. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,
529 (1856) (McLean, J., dissenting); id. at 564 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
31. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1895).
32. Id. at 544.
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because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. '' 33
And, finally: "If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitu-
tion of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane."'34
Justice Harlan's dissent urged a much more generous constitutional
interpretation. The Fourteenth Amendment, he said, guarantees "ex-
emption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society
... and discriminations which are steps toward reducing [blacks] to the
condition of a subject race." 35 He went on bluntly to state that
[e]very one knows that the statute in question had its origin in the
purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars
occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches oc-
cupied by or assigned to white persons .... No one would be so
wanting in candor as to assert the contrary.
36
Harlan showed that it was possible for a judge to cut through both
accepted legal justifications and the make-believe realities on which they
are premised to reach the actual intentions and consequences of legisla-
tion. He labeled the statute "sinister" 37 and showed uncanny foresight in
stating that "the judgement this day rendered will, in time, prove to be
quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott
case." 38
However persuasive the Harlan dissent may seem now, it obviously
failed to persuade the majority. Were there other sources of moral per-
suasion, texts that might have presented the other point of view more
effectively? Indeed, many were available; there was a virtual literary fer-
ment over issues of social inequality and integration.39 Leading black
newspapers editorialized on the subject.40 Reformers and religious
figures questioned whether separate water fountains, hotels, theaters,
railroad cars, waiting rooms, and restaurants could exist in a nation com-
mitted to "liberty for all."' 4 ' A new generation of black novelists, includ-
ing Frank Webb, Frances E.W. Harper, Sutton Griggs, Charles
Chesnutt, and Paul Lawrence Dunbar, were writing about the lives of
blacks in a nation which, although ostensibly committed to equality,
33. Id. at 551.
34. Id. at 552.
35. Id. at 556 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308
(1879)).
36. Id. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 563 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
39. See, eg., THE VOICE OF BLACK AMERICA: MJMOR SPEECHES BY NEGROES IN THE
UNIrED STATES, 1799-1971, at 249-595 (P. Foner ed. 1972).
40. See THE BLACK PRESS 1827-1890: THE QUEST FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY (M. Dann ed.
1971).




frustrated and denied their humanity and worth at every turn. 42 In many
of these books, the protagonist is an upward-striving, hard-working black
who is respectable, educated, and white-collar, but who nevertheless is
handicapped and rebuffed on his way to success.43 To be sure, many of
these novelists were not wholehearted egalitarians. Some pressed for so-
cial integration only for members of their talented class. They were
quick to distance themselves from coarser, less-well-educated Negroes-
ones who had not yet, in their opinion, earned the right to be treated by
whites as equals.44
B. Indian Cases
In the early 1800s a young, expansion-minded government sought to
justify subjugation of the Native American race in the interest of pro-
gress.45 Control over the lands and lives of Indians was necessary for the
development that our Founding Fathers foresaw.46 The 1823 decision in
Johnson v. M'Intosh 47 gave Chief Justice John Marshall a vehicle for ar-
ticulating the principles of what was to become an elaborate body of law
governing the Indians. The gist of the decision follows: although the
Indians had a right of occupancy, they had no power to alienate land
because the fee lay in the government. 48 The source of United States
ownership, Marshall explained, lay in rights gained by Great Britain
under the "Discovery Doctrine," a euphemistic name for the tacit agree-
42. See F. WEBB, THE GARIES AND THEIR FRIENDS (1857); F. HARPER, IOLA LEROY, OR
SHADOWS UPLIFTED (1892); S. GRIGGS, IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO (1889); C. CHESNUTr, THE CON-
JURE WOMAN (1899); P. DUNBAR, FOLKS FROM DIXIE (1898).
43. See R. BONE, THE NEGRO NOVEL IN AMERICA 13-18 (rev. ed. 1965). In a telling passage
from The Garies, Frank Webb describes a railroad trip from North Carolina to New York taken by
his protagonist, Charlie Ellis, and Ellis's guardian, Mrs. Bird. Shortly after they boarded the train
and found their seats, the conductor roughly shook Charlie, who was ill and sleeping, and ordered
him and Mrs. Bird out of the white car. After an argument between the conductor and the car's
passengers, eventually Mrs. Bird and the child acquiesced to group pressure and moved to the
colored section of the train. F. WEBB, supra note 42, at 110-12.
44. R. BONE, supra note 43, at 18. Was this attitude yet another insidious aspect of racism?
See generally Delgado, supra note 6 (discussing identification with the aggressor and similar mecha-
nisms by which subordinated people cooperate with their own subordination).
45. On the historical and theoretical foundations of Indian law, see V. DELORIA & C. LYTLE,
AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE (1983), and C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME,
AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 7-14 (1987).
See also R. WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES
OF CONQUEST (1990) (discussing how various European philosophies affected colonists' perceptions
of Native Americans).
46. See R. WILLIAMS, supra note 45, at 312-17 (discussing Marshall's legal rationalization of
American control over Indian lands); Williams, Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy
of European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L.
REV. 237, 254-58 (1989) (discussing rationalizations of the postrevolutionary United States govern-
ment in removing American Indians from their lands).
47. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
48. Id. at 574, 583-84.
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ment of "finders keepers" among the exploring European states.49 Mar-
shall declared that "the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no
instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable ex-
tent, impaired .... [T]heir rights to complete sovereignty, as independ-
ent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of
the soil at their own will ... was denied." 50
Perhaps recognizing the tenuousness of this "necessity," Marshall
seemed reluctant, at least on a moral level, to commit himself, as author,
to the decision he nevertheless made. His opinion is phrased in terms of
inevitability, but its result was necessary only in a purely practical sense
to legitimate an established system upon which his government relied.51
In the course of rendering his might-is-right decision, Marshall portrayed
himself as engaged in a matter-of-fact, mechanical exercise-one in
which he as judge took no personal responsibility for the outcome.5 2 To
be sure, Marshall warned that the conquered should not be "wantonly
oppressed, ' 53 but went on to observe that the tribes of Indians "were
fierce savages, whose occupation was war." a54 He set out the range of
possibilities as follows: "To leave them in possession of their country,
was to leave the country a wilderness; to govern them as a distinct peo-
ple, was impossible, because they were as brave and as high spirited as
they were fierce, and were ready to repel by arms every attempt on their
independence." 55 Cohabitation with the Indians was impossible because
it exposed the settlers to "the perpetual hazard of being massacred."' 56
49. Id. at 574-84.
50. Id. at 574.
51. See id. at 581 ("Further proofs of the extent to which this principle has been recognised,
will be found in the history of the wars, negotiations, and treaties which the different nations...
have carried on .... ); id. at 588 ("Conquest gives a title which the Courts... cannot deny .....
Marshall also stated:
[I]f the principle [of conquest] has been asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sus-
tained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; if the property of the great mass of
the community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and cannot be questioned.
So, too, with respect to the concomitant principle, that the Indian inhabitants are to be
considered merely as occupants ... incapable of transferring the absolute title to others.
However this restriction may be opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized
nations, yet, if it be indispensable to that system under which the country has been settled,
and be adapted to the actual condition of the two people, it may, perhaps, be supported by
reason, and certainly cannot be rejected by Courts of Justice.
Id. at 591-92 (emphasis added).
52. That is to say: the result seemed necessary and externally dictated so that any other result
was impossible.
53. Id. at 574 (saying that "the rights of the original inhabitants were ... [not to be] entirely
disregarded").






Whatever means necessary were thus justified to defend European
claims.
As though sensing his error in Johnson, Marshall was more gener-
ous to the cause of Indian rights and more cynical about the role of the
federal government as inheritor of "discovered lands" nine years later in
Worcester v. Georgia.5 7 Here Marshall focused on the sovereign status of
Indian nations, as recognized in treaties between them and the federal
government. The issue was whether Georgia's assertion of jurisdiction
over non-Indians residing in Cherokee territory was unconstitutional."
Georgia law required any non-Indian wishing to reside in Indian terri-
tory to secure permission from the governor and to take an oath of alle-
giance to the state's constitution and laws.5 9  Marshall declared the
provision void as directly conflicting with treaties made between the
United States and the Cherokees, 6° describing the latter, by implication,
as a sovereign nation.
61
In Worcester, did Marshall recompense for turning his back on the
Indians in Johnson? Unfortunately, he did not: the principles he estab-
lished in Johnson were later invoked and embellished in decisions that
gnawed persistently and jealously at Indian rights in land and self-gov-
ernment.62 During much of the formative period of American Indian
57. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
58. Id. at 515, 536, 540.
59. Id. at 515, 536.
60. Id. at 547-48, 550-58 (discussing treaties with the Indians).
61. Id. at 560 (noting that the tributary states "do not thereby cease to be sovereign"). Mar-
shall based his opinion on the treaties, terming them the "supreme law of the land," id. at 559, and
held that they should be read as reflecting the intent and limited understanding of the Indian parties.
Is it credible, that they should have considered themselves as surrendering to the United
States the right to dictate their future cessions, and the terms on which they should be
made? .. . It is equally inconceivable that they could have supposed themselves, by a
phrase thus slipped into an article, on another and most interesting subject, to have
divested themselves of the right of self-government .... Such a construction would be
inconsistent with the spirit of this and of all subsequent treaties .... It would convert a
treaty of peace covertly into an act, annihilating the political existence of one of the parties.
Id. at 554. The political existence of the Indian parties, said Marshall, included exclusive authority
within territorial boundaries. Id. at 557. The Treaty of Hopewell, on which he relied, went so far as
to extend this power to allow the Indians to punish any United States citizen who refused to leave
the territory within six months. Id. at 553. And Marshall stated generally that "[a] weak state, in
order to provide for its safety, may place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without
stripping itself of the right of government, and ceasing to be a state." Id. at 561.
62. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), for example, Chief Justice
Rehnquist used the approach laid down by Marshall to disadvantage Indians in holding that Indian
tribal courts lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians and may not assume jurisdiction unless
specifically authorized to do so by Congress. Id. at 194-96. This decision leaves Indian nations
devoid of authority over non-Indians who enter their territory and commit crimes against Indians or
their property. Rehnquist described the lack of Indian criminal jurisdiction as a commonly shared,
unspoken assumption of all branches of the government, id. at 197-98, 203-06; he offered as proof
the intent of Congress, gleaned from a few random acts, and his own interpretation of certain trea-
ties. Id. at 203-09.
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law, political theorists and organized religion contributed, along with the
courts, to the demeaning of Native American culture. 63 Religious lead-
ers spoke of the Indians as heathen. 64 Respected writers invoked the
doctrine of "waste" to justify the taking of Indian land, the relocation of
Indian tribes to desolate areas far from their ancestral homes, and the
relentless mining and timbering of the lands to which they were
removed.
65
Could judges and these others have been saved from committing
what is beginning to seem like a serious moral error in their treatment of
the Indians? 66 Possibly. Indian leaders themselves spoke eloquently of
the injustices being perpetrated; they were generally ignored. For exam-
ple, Mohawk chief Joseph Brant spoke forcefully about Indians' attach-
ment to and love of "those Lands which the great being above has
pointed out for our Ancestors & their Descendants, and placed them
there from the beginning, and where the Bones of our Forefathers are
Laid."'67 He asked "whether the Blood of their grand children is to be
mingled with their Bones, thro' the means of our Allies for whom We
have often so freely bled?"68 Shawnee military leader Tecumtha (1768-
1813) proclaimed:
The White people have no right to take the land from the Indians,
because they had it first, it is theirs.... Any sale not made by all, is
not valid .... All Redmen have equal rights to the unoccupied
land.... There cannot be two occupations in the same place. The
first excludes all others. It is not so in hunting or traveling, for
there the same ground will serve many, as they may follow each
other all day, but the camp is stationary, and that is occupancy. It
belongs to the first who sits down on his blanket or skins, which he
has thrown upon the ground, and till he leaves it, no other has a
63. See generally Williams, Jefferson, The Norman Yoke, and American Indian Lands, 29
ARIz. L. REV. 165, 179-80, 186 n.61 (1987) (discussing legal debates concerning American Indians'
land rights in the early 1800s); Williams, supra note 46, at 308-17 (describing the discreditation of
the Tlinglet society in Alaska in the 1880s).
64. See R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT
FIeION 42-43 (1982) (describing early American propagation of the gospel among the "heathen"-
Indians).
65. See Williams, supra note 46, at 244-45, 248-58 (noting that breaches of treaties were often
justified on the grounds that Indians were savage, barbaric, and unconcerned about civilization, land
use and economic development).
66. Revisionist historians are questioning the long-accepted doctrine that our domination of the
Native Americans was necessary or just. See generally V. DELORIA, CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS
(1975); Williams, supra note 46; Williams, supra note 63. At the same time, our treatment of the
Indians has become increasingly embarrassing in international human rights circles. Telephone in-
terview with Robert Williams, Professor of Law, University of Arizona (Feb. 3, 1991) (describing
the work of the U.N. Commission on the status of indigenous peoples).






Other Indian leaders spoke eloquently of their people's attachment
to the land in terms that flatly contradicted the prevailing idea that they
were barbarians who cared little for it. Chief Seathe of the Seattle Indi-
ans, when signing the Treaty of Port Elliot, observed:
Every part of this country is sacred to my people. Every hillside,
every valley, every plain and grove has been hallowed by some
fond memory or some sad experience of my tribe. Even the rocks
which seem to lie dumb as they swelter in the sun... thrill with
memories of past events connected with the fate of my people....
The braves, fond mother[s], glad-hearted maidens, and even
little children, who lived here... still love these solitudes. Their
deep fastnesses at eventide grow shadowy with the presence of
dusty spirits. When the last red man shall have perished from the
earth and his memory among the white men shall have become a
myth, these shores shall swarm with the invisible dead of my
tribe.7
0
These narratives, had they been read and heeded, might well have
given pause to the religious, judicial, and political figures in the white
community who were blithely bent on justifying the taking of Indian land
because Indians were unfit, spiritually and morally, to occupy it.
C. The Chinese Exclusion Case
In the late 1800s, labor and other forms of social unrest fueled a
growing xenophobia, including demands that immigration of nonwhite
populations be curtailed.71 In the midst of this nativist resurgence, the
Chinese Exclusion Case, Chae Chan Ping v. United States,72 was decided.
At issue was whether the petitioner, who had been granted a federal cer-
tificate assuring his re-entry into the United States following a visit to his
native China, could be prevented from re-entering the country.73 Fol-
lowing his temporary departure, Congress had abrogated an earlier
treaty which would have guaranteed him the right to return to the
United States, where he had resided and worked as a laborer for a
number of years. In so doing, Congress was taking action in response to
69. THE WAY: AN ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN INDIAN LITERATURE 5-7 (S. Witt & S. Steiner
eds. 1972).
70. Id. at 29. In addition to these voices, many colonial leaders, including Benjamin Franklin,
championed the Indians' cause. See Delgado, supra note 6, at 937 & nn.74, 75, 82 (describing the
"constitutional" system of the Iroquois, a system the influence of which on Benjamin Franklin was
freely acknowledged by him).
71. See Forbath, The Shaping of-the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1109,
1223 (1989) (noting that William Jennings Bryant enjoyed the support of Samuel Gompers and the
AFL in part because Bryant favored immigration restriction).
72. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
73. Id. at 582, 589.
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popular sentiment that there were too many Chinese flooding the labor
market. 74
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Field upheld the exercise of
federal power to bar Chae Chan Ping from returning.75 Not only did
Congress have the power to exclude, Field wrote, but its decision to exer-
cise that power was fully justified:
[IThe presence of Chinese laborers had a baneful effect upon the
material interest of the State, and upon public morals; ... their
immigration was in numbers approaching the character of an Ori-
ental invasion, and was a menace to our civilization; ... the dis-
content from this cause was not confined to any political party...
but was well-nigh universal;... they retained the habits and cus-
toms of their own country, and in fact constituted a Chinese settle-
ment within the State, without any interest in our country or its
institutions.
76
The Chinese Exclusion Case is notorious in the Asian-American
community; it typifies the callous, stereotypical treatment our society has
afforded Asians at several points in our history.77 Could Field have
avoided contributing this sorry chapter by exposure to a saving narra-
tive? Relatively little Asian-American literature was available in English
at the time Field wrote. But newspaper editorials and letters to the edi-
tor, many of which were written by U.S. citizens of stature, praised the
industriousness of the Chinese and their value to the U.S. labor market.7
At least one noted clergyman, Otis Gibson, championed their cause.
Writing in 1876, he defended the Chinese residing in America from the
charge that they presented "evils and dangers.., to these shores. '79 His
book, The Chinese in America, was available more than thirteen years
before Field wrote his opinion in Chan Ping. Gibson also defended the
Chinese against fellow clergy who had adopted the cause of Chinese ex-
clusion.80 In an 1873 reply to Father Buchard, Gibson rejected the
charge that the Chinese displaced native labor or caused economic dislo-
74. Id. at 594-96.
75. Id. at 609.
76. Id. at 595-96; see also id. at 608-09 (likening Congress's action to the exercise of its "never
... question[ed]" power to exclude "paupers, criminals, and persons afflicted with incurable
diseases").
77. S.-S. TSAI, THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA 56-81 (1986) (discussing American
exclusion of the Chinese); S. LYMAN, CHINESE AMERICANS 54-85 (1974) (discussing the Anti-Chi-
nese Movement in America between 1885-1910). For treatments of this and other embarrassing
chapters of our history, see P. IRONS, supra note 1, at 65, and R. TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A
DIFFERENT SHORE (1989).
78. R. TAKAKI, supra note 77, at 84, 88, 89, 91, 98.
79. 0. GIBSON, THE CHINESE IN AMERICA 4 (1877 & reprint 1978). In particular, Gibson
addresses claims that Chinese labor damages the American economy. Id. at 97-99.




cation and defended them against the "absurd" charge of moral inferi-
ority,81 pointing out that they had developed a superior civilization well
before the West.
8 2
Another book, When I Was a Boy in China,83 was written in 1887.
The author, Lee Yan Hou, had immigrated to the United States at age
twelve. Considered to be an eloquent plea for understanding, the book
exploded stereotypes of China as backward and of the Chinese as inhu-
man, conniving, or inferior.
8 4
D. The Japanese Internment Cases
In 1943 and 1944 the United States Supreme Court decided two
cases upholding Japanese internment, Hirabayashi v. United States 8 5 and
Korematsu v. United States.8 6 During WWII the federal government is-
sued a series of executive orders requiring certain Japanese-Americans to
leave their homes and be confined for the duration of the war.87 The
orders had been issued at the request of military officials, who argued
that the Japanese posed a threat of sabotage and spying-charges which
recent research refutes."" Many-perhaps all--of those interned were
loyal American citizens who lost houses and businesses as a result of
their treatment.8 9 Like the Chinese Exclusion Case, Hirabayashi and
Korematsu are replete with stereotypes of Asians as untrustworthy and
passages evidencing fear and distrust of outsiders.90 The deference to
military judgment was nearly complete; the military's allegations about a
risk of sabotage were accepted with little examination by the Court.91
81. Id. at 257.
82. Id. at 241, 249-50.
83. LEE YAN Hou, WHEN I WAS A BOY IN CHINA (1887).
84. See E. KIM, ASIAN AMERICAN LITERATURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE WRITINGS AND
THEIR SOCIAL CONTEXT 25 (1982).
85. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
86. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
87. Hirabayashi concerned a challenge to Executive Order 9066, subsequently ratified and con-
firmed by an act of Congress. 320 U.S. at 81-83. Korematsu stemmed from an appeal of a convic-
tion for violating Civilian Exclusion Order 34. 323 U.S. at 215-16, 219. Both orders authorized the
removal of certain Japanese residing in the United States, their confinement in internment facilities
for the duration of the war, and curfews for others.
88. See B. HOSOKAWA, NISEI: THE QUIET AMERICANS 292-301 (1969) (discrediting every
argument given for Japanese internment).
89. See id. at 348.
90. See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 90-91, 95-98 (accusing the Japanese community of fifth col-
umn activity, pro-Japan propaganda dissemination, and a failure to assimilate into the white popula-
tion); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218-19 (noting Japanese residents' ties to Japan and disloyalty to the
United States).
91. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217, 218 ("military authorities... concluded.., in accordance
with Congressional authority .... "; "we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military
authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population"; "we cannot say
that the war-making branches of government did not have grounds for believing...").
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A dissenting opinion by Justice Murphy calls the "racial and socio-
logical grounds [for these assumptions] questionable, ' 92 reserving special
treatment for a portion of the military report that characterized the Japa-
nese as "a large, unassimilated, tightly knit racial group, bound to an
enemy nation by strong ties of race, culture, custom and religion...
given to emperor worshipping ceremonies and to 'dual citizenship.' -93
He dismissed this part of the case against the Japanese as a patchwork of
"misinformation, half-truths and insinuations that for years have been
directed against Japanese Americans by people with racial and economic
prejudices."94 For Murphy, the Court's approval was "to adopt one of
the cruelest of the rationales used by our enemies to destroy the dignity
of the individual and to encourage and open the door to discriminatory
actions against other minority groups in the passions of tomorrow."95
He argued that individualized hearings could have been used to deter-
mine loyalty on a case-by-case basis and described any danger from the
status quo as not imminent or "urgent.
'96
Murphy's dissent is in itself a powerful counternarrative-not one of
those cautious, narrow dissents whose failure to persuade is understanda-
ble. It is lengthy, impassioned, and direct. Yet it was not the first state-
ment in support of the Japanese. A widely read novel, Etsu Sugimoto's A
Daughter of the Samurai,97 originally published in 1925, was dedicated
to Japan and America as her "two mothers, whose lives and environ-
ments were far apart, yet whose hearts met in mine." 98 She portrayed
Japanese-Americans as loyal to two cultures and sought to dispel stereo-
types of Japanese as unrelentingly warlike and forever bound to Japan.99
Her book found a sympathetic reception; critics praised it for undertak-
ing the difficult task of explaining an unfamiliar culture to the American
people.10 0 They described the book as not pleading a cause but "tel(ling)
a tale with delicacy and taste."10 1
92. Id. at 236 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 237 (quoting FINAL REPORT, JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST vii,
10-11, 22 (1942)).
94. Id. at 239.
95. Id. at 240.
96. Id. at 241-42.
97. E. SUGIMOTO, A DAUGHTER OF THE SAMuRAI (1925).
98. Id. at v.
99. See, e.g., id. at 196-220, 311-14.
100. See E. KIM, supra note 84, at 27; Contemporary Chivalry of the Samurai, N.Y. Times, Jan.
10, 1926, § 7 (Book Review), at 2.




E. Bradwell v. Illinois
Myra Bradwell, a female resident of Illinois, applied for membership
to the bar of that state.'0 2 Her application met all the requirements for
admission, including a certificate of good character and a passing grade
on the requisite examination.10 3 Illinois denied her application on the
ground that she was a woman and hence would be incapable of forming
contracts, in particular those between an attorney and a cient.'04 In a
brief, dismissive opinion signed by four other Justices, Justice Miller af-
firmed the state's denial of her application. Admission to the bar, he
wrote, is not so basic a right as to be protected as a privilege and immu-
nity guaranteed by the Constitution.105 A concurring opinion written by
Justice Bradley and joined by Justices Swayne and Field went even fur-
ther. In language dripping with condescension, they wrote:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a
wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and
woman. Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender.
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life.' 0 6
Bradley further wrote that the separation of the sexes is "founded in the
divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things"' 0 7 and described the
idea of women's practicing a profession other than that of homemaker
and nurturer as "repugnant."' 0 8 Bradley found support for his notions
on women's role in two sources-the law of contract, which in many
states prevented women from contracting separately, and theology."09
"The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble
and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general constitution
of things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases."" 0
Bradley showed few traces of remorse or ambivalence in writing his
extraordinary opinion. His conclusion seemed to him compelled and "in
the nature of things.""' Yet, at the time he wrote, numerous tracts and
books existed, urging women's liberation and condemning the suffocat-
102. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 130 (1872).
103. Id. at 130.
104. Id. at 131.
105. Id. at 139.




110. Id. at 141-42.
111. Id. at 141.
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ing stereotypes Bradley invoked. The early feminist movement contained
such powerful voices as Mary Wollstonecraft, Sojourner Truth, and Eliz-
abeth Cady Stanton. 11 2 These women and others eloquently demanded
full recognition of women's possibilities, intellect, and dignity. For ex-
ample, Margaret Fuller, in a widely disseminated essay-The Great Law-
suit, published in 1843-wrote:
[T]he time has come when a clearer vision and better action are
possible-when Man and Woman may regard one another as
brother and sister, the pillars of one porch, the priests of one
worship.
We only ask of men to remove arbitrary barriers. Some would
like to do more. But I believe it needs that Woman show herself in
her native dignity, to teach them how to aid her; their minds are so
encumbered by tradition.' 
1 3
Concerning the roles of wife and mother that Bradley found to ex-
haust women's possibilities, Fuller wrote:
I have no doubt ... that a large proportion of women would
give themselves to [that employment] .... Nature would take care
of that; no need to clip the wings of any bird that wants to soar and
sing, or finds in itself the strength of pinion for a migratory flight
.... The difference would be that all need not be constrained to
employments for which some are unfit .... 114
We would have every arbitrary barrier thrown down. We
would have every path laid open to Woman as freely as to Man. 15
F Buck v. Bell
In 1927, Oliver Wendell Holmes, joined by seven other Justices, up-
held a sterilization order issued by a Virginia court in the case of Carrie
Buck, a retarded institutionalized person.116 Ms. Buck had evidently
been born to a retarded mother and had herself given birth to a daughter
described as retarded.117 (Later commentators have discovered, how-
ever, that Ms. Buck's other daughter, who died at the age of eight from
measles, was not retarded.118)
112. See M. WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN (2d rev. ed.
1792); Truth, Ain't IA Woman?, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF LITERATURE BY WOMEN 253
(S. Gilbert & S. Gubar eds. 1985) [hereinafter NORTON ANTHOLOGY]; Stanton, Address to the New
York State Legislature (1860), reprinted in id. at 344.
113. Fuller, Women in the Nineteenth Century, in NORTON ANTHOLOGY, supra note 112, at 295,
306 (originally entitled The Great Lawsuit).
114. Id. at 308.
115. Id. at 297.
116. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
117. Id. at 205.




Holmes found little constitutional difficulty in affirming the Virginia
order. His opinion is brief-approximately three pages in length-and
full of facile analogies. 1 9 "It is better for all the world," Holmes wrote,
"if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let
them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are mani-
festly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains com-
pulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian
tubes."
120
Holmes's opinion is technically poor--easily his worst. It is nearly
devoid of any consideration of Ms. Buck's interests or of less restrictive
alternatives. A colorable equal protection argument, stemming from Vir-
ginia's practice of sterilizing only the institutionalized retarded, was sum-
marily dismissed as "the last resort of constitutional arguments." 121
Holmes's response was that "the law does all that is needed when it does
all that it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all within the lines, and
seeks to bring within the lines all similarly situated so far and so fast as
its means allow."1 22 Holmes thus treated Ms. Buck's right to reproduce
as an ordinary liberty interest, her equal protection argument like an un-
reasonable citizen's demand that the state justify its practice of fixing
potholes on the west side of town first, those on the east side later.
Could Holmes have saved himself from writing this embarrassing
opinion, one that mars the career of an otherwise eminent Justice? Yes,
but only by rejecting many of the narratives and accepted wisdoms that
constituted his views about the mentally ill. And what would have ena-
bled him to do that? When he wrote Buck v. Bell, Holmes was a camp
follower of the American eugenics movement, then in its heyday.
1 23
That movement decried the rapid breeding of the unfit and the purported
swamping of America's shores by darker, inferior southern European
stock. 124 To Holmes, his depiction of retardate Carrie Buck must have
seemed obvious and true. Yet the scientific community, even then, was
other daughter "was reported as being a bright child" (quoting Batt, They Shoot Horses, Don't
They?: An Essay on the Scotoma of One-Eyed Kings, 15 UCLA L. REv. 510, 526 (1968))).
119. See Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (comparing sterilization with compulsory vaccination in times of
epidemic).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 208.
122. Id.
123. See J. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 32, 335-36 (1981) (mentioning Holmes's belief
that breeding between Native Americans and Europeans was an aesthetically unpleasing idea);
Holmes, Law and Social Reform, in THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 399, 400-01 (M.
Lerner ed. 1943) ("I can understand better legislation that aims rather to improve the quality than to
increase the quantity of the population.").
124. See generally J. GOULD, supra note 123, at 21-23, 146-320 (discussing the American advent
of a hereditarian theory of IQ); H. LAUGHLIN, CONQUEST By IMMIGRATION (1939) (discussing
ways the government can regulate immigration in response to eugenics concerns).
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beginning to turn against the exaggerated claims of the eugenicists.
Early editions of the Encyclopedia Britannica, for example, refuted such
claims and took a more moderate view of the role of heredity in deter-
mining mental disorders and retardation. 125 At the same time, leading
biologists were urging re-examination of many of the sweeping claims of
the eugenicists. 126 Counternarratives were already beginning to be found
in the public discourse.
G. Bowers v. Hardwick
Justice White based his 1986 decision to uphold Georgia's statute
outlawing sodomy primarily on a history of cultural condemnation of the
practice. 127 White focused on the statutory prohibitions still on the
books in twenty-four states and the District of Columbia to show that
homosexuals have no "fundamental right" to engage in consensual sod-
omy in their own homes. 128 He indignantly stated that "to claim that a
right to engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best,
facetious." 1
29
For White, the only question before the court was whether homo-
sexuals have a fundamental right to engage in sodomy.130 White brushed
aside the statute's broad prohibition on all forms of sodomy, including
consensual oral sex between married couples in their own homes.131 He
also neglected to consider that even if the right, narrowly stated, is not
fundamental, it may nevertheless fall under a broader constitutional
principle-for example the emerging right of intimate association.'
32
Dismissing the possibility that homosexual behavior may be protected by
the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, as suggested by such decisions
as Loving v. Virginia,133 Griswold v. Connecticut,13 4  and Roe v.
125. See XI ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 728-29 (Heredity) (1893) (discussing the writings of
Johann Gottfried von Herder on heredity); see also THE IQ CONTROVERSY (H. Block & G. Dworkin
eds. 1976) (providing a collection of articles offering a retrospective of the eugenics debate and exam-
ining whether there is a genetic component to intelligence in light of new evidence).
126. For a description of this early controversy, see D. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS
118-28 (1985); K. LUDMERER, GENETICS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 121-24 (1972).
127. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-95 (1986).
128. Id. at 193-94.
129. Id. at 194.
130. See id. at 193-94.
131. See id. at 190 (declining to decide "whether laws against sodomy between consenting adults
in general ... are wise or desirable").
132. See generally Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980)
(describing how the emerging doctrine of freedom of intimate association spans a constitutional
spectrum including the right to privacy and to freedom of association).
133. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).




Wade,1 35 White wrote: "[I]t [is] evident that none of the rights an-
nounced in those cases bears any resemblance to the claimed constitu-
tional right .... No connection between family, marriage, or procreation
on one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been
demonstrated."1 36
White similarly dismissed on moral grounds the argument, based on
Stanley v. Georgia,13 7 that consensual conduct within the home should be
free from state interference. 138 He distinguished that decision by stating
that it was based on the constitutionally protected right to read and re-
ceive ideas.139 In contrast, White likened consensual sodomy to illegal
activities such as possession in the home of drugs, firearms, or stolen
goods, which Stanley did not protect. 14° His reasoning, of course, begs
the question: if these activities were constitutionally protected, we could
not make them illegal.
Bowers has already attracted a great deal of criticism 141 and seems
destined to join its predecessors, Plessy, Dred Scott, and Bradwell, as fla-
grantly and wantonly wrong in the public's imagination. Already, one
retired Supreme Court Justice has admitted that he regrets signing the
opinion, considering it a mistake.142 There were ample literary sources
to enable the Court to avoid-or at least sense-its error. Walt Whit-
man, Christopher Isherwood, E.M. Forster, James Baldwin, and W.H.
Auden all persuasively describe homosexual relations as potentially lov-
ing and constructive.143 For example, in his novel Maurice, E.M. Forster
wrote:
[Protagonist Clive] flung down all the barriers-not at once, for he
135. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
136. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
137. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
138. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195-96; cf Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565 (holding that the First Amendment
allows people to read or watch whatever they wish in their own homes).
139. Id. at 195.
140. Id.
141. See, eg., Hayes, The Tradition of Prejudice Versus the Principle of Equality: Homosexuals
and Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny After Bowers v. Hardwick, 31 B.C.L. REv. 375 (1990);
Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 187 (1988); Richards,
ConstitutionalLegitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 800 (1986); Stoddard, Bow-
ers v. Hardwick- Precedent by Person Predilection, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 648 (1987); Sullens, Thus Far
and No Further: The Supreme Court Draws the Outer Boundary of the Right to Privacy, 61 TUL. L.
REV. 907 (1987); Note, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE
L.J. 145 (1987).
142. See Agneshwar, supra note 4 (describing Justice Powell's doubts that the opinion was con-
sistent with his stance in Roe v. Wade).
143. See, eg., W. AUDEN, Heavy Date, in THE COLLECTED POETRY OF W.H. AUDEN 105-08
(1945); W. AUDEN, The Lesson, in id. at 116-17; W. AUDEN, What's the Matter, in id. at 143-44; J.
BALDWIN, GIOVANNI'S ROOM (1956); E. FORSTER, MAURICE (1971); C. ISHERWOOD, A SINGLE
MAN (1964); W. WHITMAN, LEAVES OF GRASS (M. Cowley ed. 1959) (1855). For an account of
Auden's relationship with Chester Kallman, see D. FARNAN, AUDEN IN LOVE (1984).
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did not live in a house that can be destroyed in a day. All that
term and through letters afterwards he made the path clear. Once
certain that Hall loved him, he unloosed his own love. Hitherto it
had been dalliance, a passing pleasure for body and mind. How he
despised that now. Love was harmonious, immense. He poured
into it the dignity as well as the richness of his being, and indeed in
that well-tempered soul the two were one.'4
In James Baldwin's first novel, Giovanni's Room, published in 1956,
the narrator describes his thoughts of Giovanni:
We were both insufferably childish and high-spirited that after-
noon and the spectacle we presented, two grown men, jostling each
other on the wide sidewalk, and aiming the cherry-pits, as though
they were spitballs, into each other's faces, must have been outra-
geous. And I realized that such . . . happiness out of which it
sprang yet more so; for that moment I really loved Giovanni, who
had never seemed more beautiful than he was that afternoon. And
watching his face, I realized that it meant much to me that I could
make his face so bright .... And I felt myself flow toward him, as
a river rushes when the ice breaks up.145
After reading such lyrical passages full of love and excitement over an-
other being, could the authors of Bowers v. Hardwick still have written as
they did? Sadly, we believe the answer is yes, just as the other saving
narratives we have identified in this section either did not reach the
judges-were not in the canon-or else somehow failed to move them.
Let us now examine why this is so.
III. Law and Literature: The Canon and the Possibility of
Counternarratives
Narratives, particularly what we have called counter- or "saving"
narratives, could conceivably serve as strong antidotes to serious moral
error. As we have seen, most serious judicial mistakes result from the
judge's inability to empathize with the litigants or their circumstances.
In many cases, a counternarrative was close at hand. The judge might
have read the counternarrative, internalized its message, and written a
wiser, or at least more nuanced, opinion. 46 Indeed, this hope constitutes
one of the most widely proclaimed advantages of the Law and Literature
movement, whose proponents believe that exposure to great texts can
144. E. FORSTER, supra note 143, at 64.
145. J. BALDWIN, supra note 143, at 121.
146. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text. Justice Marshall arguably reconsidered
Johnson v. M'Intosh nine years later, but the broad reasoning he articulated in 1823 remained capa-
ble of doing harm. See supra note 62. Today we are reconsidering the cartoon-like characterizations





enrich and humanize their readers. 147
Yet this result has not been realized to any significant extent, even
today. This Part first demonstrates, then explains, the inefficacy of sav-
ing narratives for lawyers and judges. First, the canon is always narrow
because of limitations inherent in several processes, including antholo-
gizing. .Second, a fundamental incommensurability between literature
and judging diminishes the liberating effect narratives may have on
judges. Finally, Part III asserts, in a related argument, that we are all
situated actors, constituted in large part by the "stories" or narratives by
which we understand and impose order on reality. Divergent new narra-
tives, ones that could jar and change us, always spark resistance; we re-
ject precisely those narratives that could save us from history's judgment.
A. The Role of the Anthologist: Examining the Current Canon
In part, saving narratives rarely alter judges' behavior because they
are rarely found in the "canon"-the group of texts recognized as valid
and legitimate, the "classics"-at any given period in history. 148 If a
saving narrative exists at all, it is rarely required reading-rarely found
in anthologies, rarely included in the reading lists of busy judges, and
rarely taught in the best schools. 149 Anthologists, editors, and literature
instructors may be somewhat more catholic in their tastes than the aver-
age reader, but they are still positioned actors, shaped by the views, pref-
erences, and received wisdoms of their times. 150 Because of a self-
147. See supra note 8 (reciting various arguments offered in support of the Law and Literature
movement); see also Stefancic & Delgado, Panthers and Pin-Stripes The Case of Ezra Pound and
Archibald MacLeish, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 907, 908 (1990) (asserting that Archibald MacLeish, "like
many lawyers, was an excellent technician who hungered for something else, namely literature").
148. On the debate over "the canon" and what should be included in it, see New 'Great Books'
Criticized, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 26, 1990, at E-15, col. 4 (reporting that a sixty-volume set
edited by Mortimer Adler has been criticized by Henry Louis Gates, Jr., as excluding women and
cultures of color); Gilbert & Gubar, A New Anthology of Literature by Women: Does It Define a
Canon or Merely "Baptize a Kangaroo?", Chron. Higher Educ., Nov. 22, 1989, at B-I, col. 2; Begley,
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Black Studies' New Star, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 25;
Winkler, Proponents of 'Multicultural' Humanities Research Call for a Critical Look at Its Achieve-
ments, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 28, 1990, at A-5, col. 1; and Coughlin, Despite Success, Schol-
ars Express Ambivalence About Place of Minority Literature in Academe, Chron. Higher Educ., Jan.
10, 1990, at A-7, col. 1. See generally A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 344-47
(1987) (discussing the fall from favor of the Great Books approach in many academic circles).
149. See Atlas, The Battle of the Books, N.Y. Times, June 5, 1988, § 6 (Magazine), at 24 (dis-
cussing the current academic trend of revising or rejecting the traditional literary canon); Table,
infra; Appendix A, infra. For the "Anthologist's dilemma," see infra note 150 and accompanying
text; see also Raines, Getting To the Heart of Dixie, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1989, § 7 (Book Review),
at 3 ("[It] would be wrong to attribute, unfair to impute deliberate fear to the editors or their con-
tributors .... Of the 24 consultants chosen to assemble the major sections, only one is black and
only two are women .... ).
150. See H.-G. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 250-53 (1975) (exploding the myth that tradi-
tion and reason are antithetical but explaining that each actor's perception is limited by his milieu);
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selection mechanism we discuss more fully in the next two sections, these
guardians at the gates rarely let pass a work or text shocking or divergent
enough to challenge the current sensibility. As an example of this effect,
we choose a single period, namely the present, and examine one canon-
namely that of the Law and Literature movement. We recognize that
there are many other canons and many other periods we might have ex-
amined. Yet our findings are so striking, it seems likely that they are
generalizable.
To gain a sense of the narratives commonly employed by the current
Law and Literature movement, we reviewed lists of novels, plays, and
poems compiled by authorities in the field. Because of the exhaustive
nature of these catalogs, we chose to narrow the analysis to novels only,
drawing upon four prominent scholars in the field: (1) Davenport's
Readings in Legal Literature;151 (2) J.B. White's The Legal Imagina-
tion ;152 (3) Richard Weisberg and Karen Kretschman's Wigmore's
"'Legal Novels" Expanded: A Collaborative Effort;153 and, (4) Gem-
mette's Law and Literature.1 54 We selected these lists not only because
they were compiled by pioneers of the movement, but also because each
identifies slightly different benefits to be gained from reading law and
literature and because each was prepared in a slightly different era.155
S. FISH, Introduction. Going Down the Anti-Formnalist Road, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY:
CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 1, 4
(1989) (stating that there can never be a literal meaning); S. FISH, Is There a Text in this Class?, in Is
THERE A TEXT IN Tins CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 303, 303-04
(1980) (claiming that communication can only occur when people live in the same intellectual uni-
verse); see also W. BooTH, THE COMPANY WE KEEP 40 (1988) (asserting that a clear "circularity
... springs from the obvious fact that the minds we use in judging stories have been constituted (at
least in part) by the stories we judge"); cf Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between
Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2279 (1989) (determining that com-
munication and understanding are a result of the expression of common experiences and culture).
More optimistic views exist. See J. WHITE, JUSTICE As TRANSLATION 35-36 (1990) (arguing
that language necessarily takes on private meaning based upon each person's prior experiences, but
that the communication of the language itself may form part of that experience which colors the
private meaning); C. GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 1 (1983) (stating that "[t]he reshaping of cate-
gories ... so that they can reach beyond the contexts in which they originally arose" is a necessary
part of anthropology); supra note 8 (offering a variety of views espoused by the Law and Literature
movement); see also Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985, 1018 (1990) (describing the ability of oppressed peoples to
deconstruct and reinterpret the texts of their oppressors).
151. Davenport, A Bibliography: Readings in Legal Literature, 41 A.B.A. J. 939 (1955); Daven-
port, Readings in Legal Literature: A Bibliographical Supplement, 43 A.B.A. J. 813 (1957).
152. J. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973).
153. Weisberg & Kretschman, Wigmore's "Legal Novels" Expanded: A Collaborative Effort, 7
MD. L.F. 94 (June 1977).
154. Gemmette, Law and Literature: An Unnecessarily Suspect Class in the Liberal Arts Compo-
nent of the Law School Curriculum, 23 VAL. U.L. REV. 267 (1989) (Appendix II, Cumulative Bibli-
ography) (compiling reading lists of various Law and Literature classes).
155. Weisberg and Kretschman, in particular, seem to view the Law and Literature movement




Despite the objective of at least two of the compilers to present as-
pirational, liberating works and ideas, the range of novels included in the
lists is remarkably narrow. As the Table shows, most of the novels were
written by white men, writing about white men and their experiences. 156
Although some of the works deal with themes of equality and were
thought radical at the time of their publication, few can be considered
fully emancipatory. For example, we speculated in Part I that Bowers v.
Hardwick may go down in history as one of the moral anomalies of our
age-a present-day case embracing serious moral error.157 Would care-
ful reading of the current canon have saved seven majority Justices from
their error? Would it have prevented them from joining in what may
appear to history as an abomination? Sadly, the answer is no. Works
presenting gay and lesbian relationships in a more loving, sympathetic
light do exist.158 But they are not yet part of the Canon. Nor does the
Canon contain more than token representation of the views of indigenous
people, Third World nationalists, or radical feminists of color, to name
just three groups whose problems are now or may soon be on the law's
front burner.
159
As we explain later, little can be done to escape this predicament.
Because of who we are, we will invariably select texts that provide glosses
on, or, at best, minor incremental adjustments in our current understand-
ing of social reality. 16 Texts that do more than this strike us as unreal,
coercive, "political" and are excluded.1 61 Sadly, the same forces that
lead to serious moral error lead to the formation of a literary canon that
is bland, uniform, and unlikely to save us from such errors. Neverthe-
less, this Part proposes a new, more radical role for humanists and litera-
ture-devotees interested in transforming law and legal culture.
Kretschman, supra note 153, at 94-96. The tables reflect a combined list of novels contained in the
four bibliographies listed immediately above. For a further breakdown, see Appendix A. Other
bibliographies and reading lists exist, of course. See, eg., Heilbrun & Resnick, Convergences: Law,
Literature, and Feminism, 99 YALE L.J. 1913, 1954 (1990) (listing works discussing feminism and
the law); Elkins, A Bibliography of Narrative, 40 J. LEGAL EDUc. 203, 212-18 (1990) (cataloguing
professional and popular works about law and literature).
156. See Table, infra.
157. See supra notes 127-42 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
159. See Table, infra; Appendix A, infra.
160. See supra notes 148-56 and accompanying text (arguing that anthologists are temporally
bound and thus collect works central to the cultural norm); infra notes 171-74 and accompanying
text (describing the reader as a "situated actor" naturally resistant to radically different views).
161. Recall, for example, the furious debate that currently surrounds the "Great Books" contro-




The Law and Literature Canon
Number of novels centering
around minority rights or
Race and Gender of Author Number of Authors feminism
White Men 185 7
White Women 21 3
Minority Men 2 2
Minority Women 0 0
TOTALS 208 12
B. The Appellate Function and Saving Narratives: Posner's
Incompatibility Relation
Recently, a number of writers have begun to question the usefulness
of the Law and Literature enterprise. Focusing on that enterprise, for
example, Richard Posner has written:
The functions of legislation and literature are so different, and the
objectives of the readers of these two different sorts of mental prod-
uct so divergent, that the principles and approaches developed for
the one have no useful application to the other.162
Elsewhere, Posner expands his critique to judging, urging that even great
works of literature have little to say to judges, whose objectives are bu-
reaucratic, technical, and narrowly circumscribed, and whose work in-
cludes a power dimension not present in literature.163
While Posner believes that "important opportunities for mutual illu-
mination" between law and literature exist,'6 he finds a danger in exag-
gerating the commonalities between the two fields.165 Other writers have
questioned the ability or receptiveness of legally trained readers to absorb
the lessons of great literature. 166 We believe that other reasons counsel
skepticism. As we have mentioned, judges-like other persons-are situ-
162. Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REv. 1351, 1374 (1986).
163. See id. at 1374, 1387-88; accord West, Adjudication is Not Interpretation: Some Reserva-
tions About the Law-as-Literature Movement, 54 TENN. L. REv. 203, 205-06 (1987) (warning that
although law and literature both deal in texts, law is imperative while literature is expressive).
164. R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 13-14.
165. Id. (expressing concern that seeing law and literature as parts of the same continuum con-
torts them both).
166. See, e.g., Abramson, Law, Humanities and the Hinterlands, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 27, 34





ated actors. Our identities are social constructs; we influence culture and
it us.' 67 For most persons (perhaps particularly judges), society's domi-
nant narratives will seem unexceptionable and "true"-demanding no
particular improvement or expansion. 168 Counternarratives will seem
foreign, "wrong." The self and culture are reciprocally related; but the
interaction is powerfully homeostatic. Power-Knowledge replicates itself
endlessly and ineluctably.
1 69
Structural features inherent in the work environment of appellate
judges further dampen our faith in the reformative effect of counternar-
ratives. Judges are trained to resolve legal problems on the narrowest
possible ground, 70 while literature and narratives point toward expan-
sion. Appellate judges have no juries to serve as reminders that "there
may be another story," another narrative (in addition to the prevailing
one, e.g., about the police always telling the truth).
C. Narratives and the Situated Actor: Our Stories, Our Selves
Permeating the reasons given for doubt is the realization that we are
all positioned actors. Our perception of reality is not a given, but rather
something we construct. 1 7 The devices by which we construct and make
sense of our social world are largely linguistic, consisting of categories,
concepts, and particularly narratives. 72 Exposure to new narratives,
texts, or ways of organizing reality (e.g., gay people are just like us) may
have a very real appeal-vicarious experience through reading is attrac-
tive and can be character-deepening and mind-expanding. 17 3 Yet the self
that meets, selects, (or deselects) and interprets the new narrative also
interacts with it, and does so in terms of the old narrative. 74 Change is
at best slow and incremental. Few of us have been fundamentally
changed by reading a single book or even series of them. As Part IV
shows, a more effective approach is at hand, one that entails a new and
more audacious role for the humanist and would-be reformer.
167. See Delgado, supra note 12, at 2440; infra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
168. See Delgado, supra note 12, at 2412; Delgado, supra note 6, at 947.
169. Michel Foucault coined the term. See M. FOUCAULT, POWER-KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED
INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977, at 233 (1980).
170. See, eg., United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J.,
concurring), cerL denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977); L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 155-56, 162-73.
171. See Delgado, supra note 6, at 947; Delgado, supra note 12, at 2416-18.
172. See P. BERGER & T. LUCKMAN, supra note 12, at 34-46 (discussing the importance of
language to attaining knowledge). See generally I & 2 P. RICOEUR, TIME AND NARRATIVE (1984-
85); Delgado & Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories? Law Reform, Critical Librarianship
and the Triple Helix Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REV. 207, 216 (1989).
173. See W. BOOTH, supra note 150, at 223.
174. See supra note 150 and sources cited therein.
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IV. Breaking the Circle: Two Ways of Avoiding Serious Moral
Error
We envision two ways to break the lockstep, thus enabling judges to
avoid the types of mistakes we include within the term "serious moral
error." 175 The first way is to seek out and disseminate discordant new
texts in the hopes that these will enable judges to expand their sympa-
thies and avoid the condemnation of history's judgment. A suggested list
of additions to the current Law and Literature canon is included in Ap-
pendix B to this Article.176 The authors disagree on how much even
conscientious reading of this "outsider literature" will help. 177 Because
judges wield such significant power, however, any avenue should be ex-
plored. Moreover, judges are interested in transcendence and avoidance
of history's condemnation. In a sense, everyone is, but judges perhaps
more than most: it is akin to being overruled.
The second is for humanists inside and outside the law to take on a
function we call "the oppositionist as film critic." 178. Proposing new, bet-
ter texts is a slow and uncertain way to proceed, one certain to meet
resistance. Destruction, however, is more dynamic and readily accom-
plished.179 It can be carried out by the usual tools of the deconstruction-
ist: (1) showing false necessity (the narrative need not have gone that
way); (2) showing self-interest behind a story or presupposition; and (3)
using irony, humor, and metaphor to destabilize the easy acceptance that
surrounds the current tale or understanding. 80
175. See supra note 2.
176. The list contains some titles calculated to enrich experience with "outsider" cultures and
perspectives-a lack of which we believe plays a part in most cases of serious moral error. See
Appendix B, infra.
177. One of us believes that unawareness is the principal problem; the other believes that judges,
like most readers, will simply ignore narratives that differ drastically from their own. These differ-
ences are perhaps only matters of degree-the same forces that cause an anthologist to exclude a
work from the canon cause us as readers to devalue the work even if we happen across it. Placing an
arresting, novel piece of "outsider" literature in the canon is obviously one step in improving the
chance of the message's being heard. In this, we agree.
178. By this, we do not literally mean criticizing films. Rather, we propose the task of critiqu-
ing, jarring, and displacing-of showing the banal, self-serving nature of many of the ruling narra-
tives in current legal tradition. For another treatment of this subject, see Delgado, supra note 12, at
2437-40.
179. See Delgado, supra note 12, at 2415.
180. See Delgado, supra note 6, at 2425-26; Delgado, supra note 12, at 947 (detailing how the
deconstructionist process can work). There are several current myths and dominant narratives in
the law: Cinderella is the myth that justice and the right will ultimately always prevail; as applied to
law, it is the myth that our common law and constitutional jurisprudence are evolving toward higher
and higher reaches of moral sensitivity and refinement. Fair fight is the myth that our current
methods for sifting out and identifying merit and justice are fair and equitable. Just deserts is the
myth that the winner in any competitive struggle or market place deserved to win and is superior.




Creating a genuinely new narrative, like creating a new movie script,
takes real ability and resources.181 Further, even if the new narrative is
better than the old one, there is no guarantee that it will be perceived as
such. Destabilizing and deleting the old edifice of narratives may be eas-
ier, and is probably a logically prior first step toward building a better,
fairer social world. 1
82
Could humanists in the Law and Literature movement take on this
role, assuming they desired to do so? Despite their formidable training
and skills, might it not turn out that they are just as unable as judges to
break free from the constraints of the familiar and move us onto the path
of liberation? There are grounds for cautious hope.
First, many of the canonical texts originally had "bite," were revolu-
tionary and audacious when first written, but have become tame and
commonplace through the passage of time.'8 3 The humanists know this
better than others; since they know well the setting in which those now-
tamed texts were delivered, they know how revolutionary they were for
their times. 184 Further, many of them are experts in textual analysis-
they know the multiple meanings and interpretations a passage may be
seen to have. Accustomed to discovering hidden riches in familiar mate-
rial, many of them are more receptive than others to new material, new
texts. Moreover, as literature experts they are in a better position than
most of us to know developing writers, schools, and ideas. Their train-
ing, then, equips them well for the role of critic-dispassionate appraiser
of the extant stock of cultural narratives and stories.
Will they take on this more audacious role? Probably not, unless
pressed (shamed?) by outsider writers to do so. Teaching receptive stu-
dents clever observations on language and text is an easy, enjoyable life.
Until someone points out to you that Bowers v. Hardwick was decided on
your watch, that you did nothing, that your favorite texts did nothing to
stop it, that a highly educated group of judges educated at schools like
yours and participating in your culture-the one you helped to create--
wrote it, and that no one seems to have found this appalling script lack-
181. Even the destructive-constructive opposition can be pressed too far. Many who criticize
deconstruction as nihilistic and corrosive have a limited, almost banal notion of what being "con-
structive" is. It often turns out that they are acting out in uncreative ways standard, stereotyped
moves that merely reshuffle the hierarchy slightly.
182. See Delgado, supra note 12, at 2413-15, 2437-40.
183. See Danto, The Canon and the Wisdom of the West, HARPER'S, May 1990, at 33; see also J.
WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984) (describing common themes which run
amongst the canonical works and suggesting methods of applying the themes to the law).
184. Notice, for example, how we canonize and tame today the political writings of Locke, Hob-
bes, Paine, and Thoreau. These writers were true revolutionaries who believed in the right to over-
throw any oppressive government. We conveniently neglect to consider that they might also have
been writing for our times, not just that of kings.
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ing. As with judges, there is nothing like the fear of tomorrow's judg-
ment to instill a little needed reexamination into what we do for a
living.1
85
185. Fear of tomorrow's judgment may also induce perseveration--e., digging in and trying
even more desperately to justify the harm one does today by writing an even more normative-or
literary-opinion. For the view that fear is not necessarily redemptive, see Delgado, Norms and
Narratives Toward a Critique of Nornativity in Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. Rnv. 935 (1991). See
also Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2280, 2281 (1989)





THE LAW AND LITERATURE CANON
The following list contains the titles (novels only) from which Table
A, supra, was prepared, broken down by race and gender of author. We
used four sources in preparing the master list. The source of each title
is indicated in the list.
1. Davenport, A Bibliography: Readings in Legal Literature, 41
A.B.A. J. 939 (1955); supplemented, Davenport, Readings in Legal
Literature: A Bibliographical Supplement, 43 A.B.A. J. 813
(1957).
2. J.B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973).
3. Weisberg & Kretschman, Wigmore's "Legal Novels" Expanded: A
Collaborative Effort, 7 MD. L.F. 94 (June 1977).
4. Gemmette, Law and Literature: An Unnecessarily Suspect Class in
the Liberal Arts Component of the Law School Curriculum, 23 VAL.
U.L. REv. 267 (1989) (Appendix II, Cumulative Bibliography).
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